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Abstract
This article focuses on two distinct faces of globalization: the decrease
in trade costs of goods and the decline of a±liation costs of joint ventures
by foreign ¯rms with local ¯rms. The decrease of a±liation costs drives
relocation of ¯rms from the North to the South. When the market size of
the North is relatively small (resp. large), the growth rate monotonously
decreases (resp. ¯rst decreases and rises after this) with a decline of
a±liation costs. In the case of lowering trade costs, the ¯rm share in the
North evolves as a U-shaped curve (resp. monotonously increases) when
the market size of the North is relatively small (resp. large). Growth
rates are raised with agglomeration in the North. Finally, we present
some welfare implications.
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1 Introduction
When ¯rms operate in foreign countries, they a±liate and share their pro¯ts
with local ¯rms in many cases. For foreign ¯rms, there are many reasons which
induce them to a±liate with local ¯rms to construct their own plants. We can
classify these reasons into two: environmental and political. Regarding the en-
vironmental reasons, foreign ¯rms face legal, cultural, and climatic di®erences
between their host and home countries. A±liation with local ¯rms helps foreign
investors ¯ll those types of gaps. Foreign ¯rms may require a large and uncertain
number of permits in order to do business. Foreign ¯rms may also be systemati-
cally subjected to greater pressures to directly or indirectly pay o® local o±cials.
Foreign ¯rms may have much higher costs of acquiring information about lo-
cal production conditions, legal systems, and local consumers.1 In those cases,
a±liation with local ¯rms enables foreign ¯rms to overcome country- speci¯c
di±culties. On the other hand, we can point out political reasons. There are
equity share regulations for foreign investment in some countries. For example,
in China, there is an equity share regulation in the automobile industry. There
are also equity share regulations in Russia (insurance industry), Brazil (¯nance
and transportation), and India (¯nance, insurance, and telecommunications)
(JETRO 2012).
For example, in China, most foreign automobile ¯rms a±liate with local
¯rms and share pro¯ts when they start to operate in China. Wang (2003)
reported that, between 1991-1998, of 604 foreign investment companies, 567
(or 93.8 percent) were joint ventures with local ¯rms. The dominance of joint
ventures is partly explained by the mandatory equity share regulations. In ad-
dition, foreign investors often ¯nd that, even without the institutional restraint,
the joint venture is essential. In order to accomplish the goals of the Chinese
system, Chinese partners are essential to help understand the functioning of
the local market and the business norms. Managing the cross-cultural aspects
of relationships is di±cult if foreign ¯rms want to exploit the market indepen-
dently. This pattern of investment can also reduce initial risks. Wang (2003)
pointed out that these reasons enhance joint ventures in the Chinese automobile
industry.
In this paper, we study the in°uences of two types of "globalization." The
decrease in trade costs of goods is the one aspect of globalization. The other as-
pect of globalization is the decline of "a±liation costs" which are associated with
the operation of North ¯rms in the South. In our paper, we assume that North
¯rms should a±liate with local ¯rms when they operate in the South. When
they construct joint ventures in the South, North ¯rms should share pro¯ts with
local ¯rms, which we call "a±liation costs." These two types of globalization,
decline in trade costs and a±liation costs, in°uence ¯rms' location and economic
growth. For example, as shown in the present paper, a decline of a±liation costs
drives the hollowing out of industries from the North to the South. Meanwhile,
a su±cient decrease of trade costs manifests the agglomeration of manufactur-
1Baldwin et al. (2002: Chapter 12) and Yamamoto (2008) constructed static models in
which location shifts of ¯rms incur costs.
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ing ¯rms in the North. Such location behavior of ¯rms has large impacts on
economic growth.
Multilateral negotiations under General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade
(GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) have fostered the liberalization of
the trade in goods, and many countries have committed to maintain low levels
of tari® rates. Although the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS)
have been contributing toward expanding trade in services, the progress of ex-
panding trade in services is still limited. Then, ¯rms which operate in foreign
countries should incur substantial extra costs, i.e., a±liation costs. However,
the a±liation costs of foreign ¯rms have decreased in recent years. The TPP
(Trans-Paci¯c Strategic Economic Partnership) aims to standardize patent sys-
tems and copyrights among signatory countries. The standardization of the legal
system (patents and copyrights) will lower the a±liation costs of multinational
¯rms.
The decrease in a±liation costs raises the operation of ¯rms in foreign coun-
tries. Fujita and Ishii (1998) reported that, from 1975 to 1994, the number of
overseas plants of Japanese electronics ¯rms located in East Asia increased from
40 to 143. Furthermore, Toyota (2011) reported that, in 2001, 9,777,191 vehicles
were produced in Japan, 11,424,689 were produced in the U.S., and 2,334,440,
were produced in China. In 2001, the U.S. was the largest producer of automo-
biles. In 2006, Japan produced 11,484,233 vehicles, the largest number in the
world. On the other hand, in 2009, China became the largest producer of auto-
mobiles, producing 10,383,831, while Japan produced 7,934,057. In China, the
number of vehicle products has monotonously increased year by year. In 2001,
China entered the WTO, which lowers the a±liation costs in China, and foreign
investments have progressed since then. For example, in 2008, over 80 percent
of vehicles were produced by foreign-owned joint ventures (Kwan, 2009). This
suggests that, in China, foreign-owned joint venture ¯rms have increased with
the decline in a±liation costs.
In this paper, a Grossman-Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990)-type endoge-
nous growth model with two countries is developed, in which the operation of
manufacturing ¯rms in the South incurs some a±liation costs. This means that,
when a manufacturing ¯rm operates in the South, this ¯rm should consign some
of the product line to a local ¯rm. Without local ¯rms, manufacturing ¯rms
cannot produce their products in the South. Manufacturing ¯rms should share
their pro¯ts with local ¯rms. Those pro¯t sharing with local ¯rms are a±liation
costs for North manufacturing ¯rms.
Intuitively, a decline in a±liation costs raises the pro¯ts of foreign ¯rms in the
South and, thus, encourages ¯rms to relocate in the South. Then, manufactured
goods market in the North becomes less competitive and the pro¯ts gained in the
North increases. However, manufactured goods market in the South becomes
competitive and the pro¯ts gained in the South decreases. If ¯rms' pro¯ts
are raised with this movement, innovation activities that produce patents to
obtain pro¯ts are manifested, which results in higher growth rates. Meanwhile,
if ¯rms' pro¯ts are lowered, innovation activities are reduced and growth rates
are lowered.
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In fact, the present paper shows that a decline in a±liation costs can monotonously
reduce the growth rates of the economy. In this case, the negative e®ect of de-
cline in a±liation costs on growth rates overcomes the positive e®ect. On the
other hand, growth rates may ¯rst decrease and increase after this, with a de-
cline in a ¯rm's a±liation costs. This suggests that the positive e®ect of a
decline in a±liation costs on growth rates might overcome the negative e®ect
when a±liation costs are small. The pattern that emerges depends on the rela-
tive market size. When the market size of the North is relatively small, a decline
in a±liation costs reduces growth rates of the economy. Meanwhile, when the
market size of the North is relatively large, the growth rate follows a U-shaped
curve as a±liation costs decrease. Thus, our paper o®ers richer implications
about the relationship between economic growth and globalization.
We also study the e®ect of trade costs. A decline in trade costs a®ects
industrial location by changing the balance of the e®ects of market size and
a±liation costs. Generally, a large market country attracts more ¯rms than a
small market country. This tendency is manifested by a decline in trade costs
when trade costs are high. However, the tendency is weakened when trade costs
are su±ciently low. Instead, the e®ect of a±liation costs becomes dominant,
and, thus, ¯rms avoid operating in the South.
If the population of the North is small enough relative to that of the South,
the number of ¯rms in the North ¯rst decreases and then increases after a decline
in trade costs. On the other hand, if the population in the North is relatively
large, the number of ¯rms in the North monotonously increases with a decline
in trade costs since the two e®ects reported above work for agglomeration in
the North and are manifested by a decline in trade costs. In the former case,
the growth rate follows a U-shaped curve, while, in the latter case, the growth
rate monotonously increases with a decline in trade costs.
We also present the welfare implications of the model. In a case in which
the population in the North is small enough relative to the South, the welfare of
both countries would follow U-shaped curves with a decline of a±liation costs.
In this case, the value of patents increases with a decline of a±liation costs, since
the market size of the South is large. This asset value e®ect raises the welfare
of the North. On the other hand, growth rates monotonously decrease with a
decline in a±liation costs, which reduces the welfare of both countries. These
two e®ects (asset value and growth rate) create a U-shaped curve of welfare
movements.
In a case in which the population in the North is relatively large, the welfare
of the North would monotonously decrease, and the welfare of the country would
follow a U-shaped curve. In this case, the asset value e®ect is weak, which makes
the welfare decrease monotonously. On the other hand, since growth rates
increase when a±liation costs become low, the welfare in the South follows a
U-shaped curve. In both cases, the welfare of the whole economy also follows
a U-shaped curve. Thus, our research shows that globalization in terms of a
¯rm's a±liation costs reduces the welfare of the economy in many cases, since
the e®ect of a reduction in growth rates is large.
Finally, our numerical simulations show that a decline in trade costs raises
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growth rates in a wide range of parameters. With this movement, the welfare
of the North, the South, and the whole economy improves. Thus, our study
shows that globalization of international goods trade raises the welfare of the
economy.
According to Gao (2007), the recent global shifting of manufacturing from
the North to the South received signi¯cant attention from researchers. In ad-
dition, Hatch and Yamamura (1996) reported that many manufacturing goods
in East Asia were developed in Japan. The ¯rms that produce manufactured
goods agglomerated in Japan, which support the rapid growth of Japan. In
recent years, manufacturing ¯rms relocated from Japan to other countries, such
as Korea, Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China, and the growth
rates of Japan decreased with these movements. Our model explains the mech-
anism behind the spread of ¯rms to some countries near Japan. Furthermore, in
our paper, we emphasize the importance of studying the parameters of market
size, trade costs, and a±liation costs of ¯rms in the analysis of the e®ects of
globalization on the growth rates.
The literature makes evident the many aspects of the relationship of eco-
nomic geography, international trade, and growth.2 Baldwin, Martin, and Ot-
taviano (2001), Martin and Ottaviano (1999, 2001), Yamamoto (2003), and
Gao (2007) are studies in which the endogenous growth model of Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1991) (GHR) is integrated with New Eco-
nomic Geography (NEG) models µa la Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).
These researchers studied the relationship between growth and agglomeration
and show that agglomeration raises economic growth as trade costs decrease.
Minitti and Parello (2011) constructed a model of GHR with NEG in which
trade integration has no e®ects on economic growth. Our model in this paper is
also a GHR-type model with NEG, which involves the a±liation costs of ¯rms.
In our paper, we show that a±liation costs in°uence the relationship between
growth and economic geography.
Section 2 is a presentation of the model and some propositions derived from
the analysis. An analysis of the welfare levels in both countries is presented in
Section 3. Section 4 is the conclusion of the paper.
2 The model
There are two countries, the North and the South. We assume that patents can
be produced exclusively in the North. Variables referring to the North have the
subscript N , and those referring to the South, S. Each country is endowed with
a ¯xed amount of labor, LN and LS , respectively. Labor can be used to produce
homogeneous agricultural goods and di®erentiated manufactured goods. While
labor can be mobile between sectors in the same country, it cannot be mobile
between di®erent countries.
The intertemporal utility function of the consumer in country i (i = N;S)
2See Kuznets (1966) and Long and Wong (1997).
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is as follows:
Ui =
Z 1
0
e¡½t (Yit + ¹ logMit) dt; (1)
where
Mit =
·Z nNt
0
mNit (!)
¾¡1
¾ d! +
Z nS
0
mSit
³
!
0´¾¡1¾
d!
0
¸ ¾
¾¡1
; ¾ > 1: (2)
Here, Yit is the consumption of agricultural goods at time t in country i, Mit is
the consumption of the composite of manufactured goods at time t in country i, ½
is the subjective discount rate, and ¹ is a positive parameter. mjit (!) denotes
the consumption of manufactured variety ! produced by a ¯rm in country j
(j = N;S). njt is the number of varieties produced by a ¯rm in country j
at time t. njt is also the number of operating ¯rms in country j at time t.
nt ´ nNt + nSt denotes the total number of varieties at time t. ¾ represents
the elasticity of substitution among di®erentiated goods. Following Grossman
and Helpman (1991), the market is characterized by free ¯nancial movements
between two countries. Thus, the interest rate of both countries is the same
at all times (rNt = rSt = rt). The intertemporal optimization behavior of the
consumer results in the next equation
rt = ½: (3)
We derive the following instantaneous demand functions (we take homoge-
neous goods as the numeraire),
Mit =
¹
Pit
; (4)
Pit =
µZ nNt
0
pNit(!)1¡¾d! +
Z nSt
0
pSit(!
0
)1¡¾d!
0
¶ 1
1¡¾
; (5)
Yit = Eit ¡ ¹; (6)
mjit (!) =
¹Pit
¾¡1
pjit (!) ¾
; (7)
where Pit is called the `price index' in country i at time t. pjit (v) is the consumer
price of variety !, which is produced in j and consumed in i, and Eit represents
the instantaneous expenditure of a consumer in country i at time t.
Here, we describe the production structure of the agricultural sector. The
agricultural good market is perfectly competitive. We assume that in both
countries, one unit of agricultural goods is produced with one unit of labor.
We assume that the international trade of homogeneous goods incurs no trade
costs. Therefore, the equilibrium wages in the two countries are both one:
wN = wS = 1.3
3If (ENt ¡ ¹)LN +(ESt ¡ ¹)LS ¸ LN , agricultural goods are produced in both countries
at the equilibrium. Here, Est ¸ 1, in this model. We, then, assume that (1¡ ¹)LN +
(1¡ ¹)LS ¸ LN to ensure that the agricultural sector exists in both countries.
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In the manufacturing sector, manufacturing ¯rms operate under a Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977)-type monopolistic competition. Each ¯rm produces di®erentiated
goods, and each variety is produced by one ¯rm. To start a production activity,
a ¯rm in country j is required to buy one unit of patent produced by the
innovation sector at market price Vjt, which plays the role of ¯xed costs for the
¯rms. Moreover, a ¯rm locating in a country uses one unit of labor in its country
as the marginal input to produce one unit of manufactured goods. Potential
¯rms can freely enter a production activity as long as the pure pro¯ts are positive
and can choose to locate in a country where pro¯ts are higher. We assume that,
when a manufacturing ¯rm produces in the North, it does not incur a±liation
costs. When a manufacturing ¯rm operates in the South, the ¯rm should consign
some of its product line to a local ¯rm. Without local ¯rms, manufacturing
¯rms cannot produce their products in the South. Manufacturing ¯rms should
share their pro¯ts with local ¯rms. Consignation costs would then represent
a±liation costs for manufacturing ¯rms. Under this production structure, each
manufacturing ¯rm sets the following constant markup (mill) price:
pN = pS =
¾
¾ ¡ 1 : (8)
The international trade of manufactured goods incurs `iceberg'-type trade costs.
If a ¯rm sends one unit of its good to a foreign country, it must dispatch T units
of the good. T ¡ 1 > 0 represents the trade costs. Thus, consumer prices are
pji = pj if j = i, and pji = Tpj if j 6= i. The price index in country i can be
written as,
Pit =
¾
¾ ¡ 1 ¢ (nit + njt¿)
1
1¡¾ ; i; j 2 fN;Sg ; i 6= j; (9)
where ¿ ´ T¡(¾¡1) and ¿ represent the freeness of trade. ¿ = 0 describes the
case of autarky, whereas ¿ = 1 implies free trade. From (7) and (8), instanta-
neous pro¯ts of ¯rms in the North and South can be expressed as follows:
¼Nt =
³¹
¾
´· LN
nNt + nSt¿
+
LS¿
nNt¿ + nSt
¸
; (10)
¼St =
³¹
¾
´· LN¿
nNt + nSt¿
+
LS
nNt¿ + nSt
¸
: (11)
Furthermore, the output of a ¯rm in country i is expressed as
qit = (¾ ¡ 1)¼it: (12)
We assume that innovation activities occur exclusively in the North. In the
innovation sector, we assume that lR units of labor for R&D activities for a time
interval dt produce a new variety of ¯nal goods according to the following:4
4If we assume local knowledge spillovers and dnt = lR(nNt+ÁnSt)dt=´, where 0 < Á < 1,
all results in this paper are qualitatively unchanged.
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dnt =
lRnt
´
dt: (13)
The cost of the R&D activities is wN lRdt because the R&D sector is located
only in the North. Producing the patent creates a value for the manufacturing
¯rms in country i of Vitdnt. We assume that there is free entry into the R&D
race. Therefore, the following free-entry condition must hold:
Vit · ´
nt
; with equality whenever _nt ´ dnt
dt
> 0; i 2 fN;Sg : (14)
A patent used in the North generates returns ¼Nt, while a patent used in
the South generates returns µ¼St, where 0 < µ < 1. When a manufacturing
¯rm operates in the South, it should consign some parts of the production
lines to a local ¯rm and share pro¯ts with the local ¯rm. Without local ¯rms,
manufacturing ¯rms cannot produce any manufactured goods in the South.
Here, µ is the share of pro¯ts that a manufacturing ¯rm obtains when it produces
in the South. The a±liated local ¯rm obtains the share of 1¡ µ in pro¯ts. As is
shown later, manufacturing ¯rms determine µ endogenously to maximize their
pro¯ts. We assume that there are risk-free assets and the interest rate is rt.
The value of the ¯rm, which is the market price of the patent, is equalized to
the present value of the sum of the discounted pro¯t over time. >From (10) and
(11), the values of the patent used in the North and the South are represented
by
VNt =
Z 1
t
e¡r(¿¡t) ¢ ¼N¿d¿; (15)
VSt =
Z 1
t
e¡r(¿¡t) ¢ µ¼S¿d¿; (16)
respectively. Di®erentiating (15) and (16) with respect to t, we can obtain the
no-arbitrage conditions for capital investment as follows:
¼Nt + _VNt = rVNt: (17)
µ¼St + _VSt = rVSt: (18)
Next, we describe the behavior of local ¯rms in the South. In the South,
starting up a local production ¯rm requires {=nt units of southern labor. When
a local ¯rm cooperates with a manufacturing ¯rm, the cost at time interval dt
is (wS{=nt) dt. We assume that the bene¯t of the local ¯rm at time interval
dt is VLtdt. The condition, then, that local ¯rms in the South cooperate with
manufacturing ¯rms is as follows:
VLt ¸ {
nt
: (19)
Meanwhile, the value of an a±liated local ¯rm is as follows:
VLt =
Z 1
t
e¡r(¿¡t) ¢ (1¡ µ)¼S¿d¿: (20)
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Di®erentiating (20) with respect to t, we obtain the no-arbitrage condition of a
local ¯rm as follows:
(1¡ µ)¼St + _VLt = rVLt: (21)
Manufacturing ¯rms that operate in the South must consign some parts of
their production lines to local ¯rms and share their pro¯ts. Without local ¯rms,
manufacturing ¯rms operating in the South cannot produce any manufactured
goods. A manufacturing ¯rm presents a take-it-or-leave-it o®er of µ to a local
¯rm. If a local ¯rm accepts this o®er, the local ¯rm and the manufacturing ¯rm
cooperate to produce their products. A manufacturing ¯rm o®ers the share of
µ, in which the bene¯t of a local ¯rms equals the cost of theirs. Therefore, the
value of the local ¯rm satis¯es the next equation:5
VLt =
{
nt
: (22)
If nSt > 0, from the free-entry conditions of manufacturing goods ¯rms produc-
ing in the South, VSt = ´=nt must be satis¯ed. Equations (16) and (20) mean
that
VSt =
µ
1¡ µVLt: (23)
Then, substituting (22) and (23) into (14), we obtain the following equation:
µ
1¡ µ
{
nt
· ´
nt
: (24)
Manufacturing ¯rms that operate in the South must determine µ, which satis¯es
(24). The left-hand side (LHS) of (24) represents the bene¯t of manufacturing
goods ¯rms locating in the South. The right-hand side (RHS) of (24) represents
the cost of R&D investment. If LHS of (24) is smaller than RHS of (24), the
operation of manufacturing ¯rms in the South is not pro¯table, and the number
of manufacturing ¯rms locating in the South becomes zero. Therefore, when
there are manufacturing ¯rms locating in the South, the following equation
must hold:
µ =
´
{ + ´
: (25)
Equation (25) shows that, when a±liation costs are high, µ becomes low. If
{ = 1, µ = 0. If { = 0, µ = 1. When (25) is satis¯ed, (21) becomes the
same equation to the (18). Thus, equilibrium conditions in the asset market are
satis¯ed.
5We assume that the value of the outside option for local ¯rms is zero. If a local ¯rm
requires a larger share than 1 ¡ µ, this ¯rm is rejected by a manufacturing ¯rm, and the
manufacturing ¯rm o®ers 1¡ µ to other potential local ¯rms.
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3 Equilibrium
Let us de¯ne st ´ nNt=(nNt + nSt) as the share of manufacturing ¯rms in the
North. In equilibrium, if 0 < st < 1 holds, the following equation must hold:
¼Nt = µ¼St: (26)
This is because capital returns are equalized in equilibrium. From (10), (11),
and (26), the equilibrium share of manufacturing ¯rms in the North is
s¤ =
(1¡ µ¿)LN + (¿ ¡ µ)¿LS
(1¡ ¿) [(1¡ µ¿)LN ¡ (¿ ¡ µ)LS ] : (27)
Note that (27) is true only if the RHS is in [0; 1]. Otherwise, s¤ is either 0 or
1. Di®erentiating s¤ with respect to µ,6 we can obtain the following proposition
(See Appendix B for the proof):
Proposition 1 For the interior equilibrium (i.e., s¤ 2 (0; 1)), an increase in µ
decreases the share of manufacturing ¯rms in the North.
When st = 1 and ¼Nt ¸ µ¼St are satis¯ed, it holds that s¤ = 1. From (10)
and (11), when
µ · µN ´ ¿(LN + LS)
¿2LN + LS
; (28)
we have s¤ = 1. In the case that LN=LS · 1=¿ , we have 0 < ¿ < µN · 1. On
the other hand, when st = 0 and ¼Nt · µ¼St are satis¯ed, it holds that s¤ = 0.
From (10) and (11), when
µ ¸ µS ´ LN + ¿
2LS
¿(LN + LS)
; (29)
s¤ = 0. In the case that LN=LS · ¿ , we have 0 < µS · 1. Simple calculations
show that µN < µS (See Appendix A). For an interior equilibrium to exist for
µ 2 (0; 1), we present the following assumption:
Assumption 1 It holds that LN=LS · 1=¿ .
This suggests that the population in the North is not as large as that in the
South. Under that assumption, we have µN · 1, and, if µ 2 (µN ;minfµS ; 1g),
it holds that s¤ 2 (0; 1).
Because the share of manufacturing ¯rms in the North, s¤, is constant from
(27), we di®erentiate s with respect to t as follows:
_nt
nt
=
_nNt
nNt
=
_nSt
nSt
´ g: (30)
6From (25), a higher µ corresponds to a lower {, which implies lower a±liation costs in
the South.
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If _nt > 0, di®erentiating (14) with respect to t, we can obtain the following
equation:
_Vit
Vit
= ¡ _nt
nt
= ¡g: (31)
Substituting (31) into (17), we obtain the value of a patent that is used in
the North as follows:
VNt =
¼Nt
½+ g
: (32)
Then, substituting (10), (31), and (32) into (14), the growth rate is given by
g =
¹
´¾
·
LN
(1¡ ¿)s+ ¿ +
¿LS
1¡ (1¡ ¿)s
¸
¡ ½: (33)
3.1 E®ects of a±liation costs
Di®erentiating (33) with respect to µ, we can obtain the following equation:
´¾
¹
@g
@µ
=
·
¡ (1¡ ¿)LN
((1¡ ¿)s+ ¿)2 +
(1¡ ¿)¿LS
(1¡ (1¡ ¿)s)2
¸
@s
@µ
; (34)
where @s=@µ < 0 from Proposition 1. The ¯rst term in the square bracket
of (34) represents the e®ect of s on pro¯ts gained in the North. This e®ect
is negative because an increase in the share of ¯rms in the North exacerbates
the market competition in the North and decreases the pro¯ts gained in the
North. The second term in the square bracket of (34) represents the e®ect of s
on pro¯ts gained in the South. This e®ect is positive because an increase in the
share of ¯rms in the North ameliorates the market competition in the South and
increases the pro¯ts gained in the South. When LN is very small (resp. large)
relative to LS , the absolute value of ¡(1¡ ¿)LN=((1¡ ¿)s+ ¿)2 is small (resp.
large) relative to the absolute value of (1¡ ¿)¿LS=(1¡ (1¡ ¿)s)2. Then, when
LN is very small (resp. large) relative to LS , the term in the square bracket
becomes positive, and, thus, an increase in µ decelerates (resp. accelerates) the
growth rates.
Substituting (27) into (34), we can obtain the following equation:
¹
´¾
@g
@µ
= ¡ (1¡ ¿) [(1¡ µ¿)LN ¡ (¿ ¡ µ)LS ]
2
(1 + ¿)2(1¡ µ¿)2(¿ ¡ µ)2LNLS F (µ)
@s
@µ
; (35)
where
F (µ) = (¿ ¡ µ)2LS ¡ ¿(1¡ µ¿)2LN : (36)
From Proposition 1 (i.e., @s=@µ < 0), we know that @g=@µ R 0 is equivalent to
F (µ) R 0. We denote that µ^ is the unique solution of F (µ) = 0 in (¿;1). To
investigate the sign of F (µ), we have the following proposition (See Appendix
C for the proof).
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Proposition 2 (E®ects of a±liation costs on growth rates).
i) When LN=LS < ¿3, it holds that @g=@µ < 0 for µ 2 (µN ; µS).
ii) When LN=LS 2 (¿3; ¿), it holds that @g=@µ < 0 for µ 2 (µN ; µ^) and @g=@µ >
0 for µ 2 (µ^; µS).
iii) When LN=LS 2 (¿; 1=¿), it holds that @g=@µ < 0 for µ 2 (µN ; µ^) and
@g=@µ > 0 for µ 2 (µ^; 1).
We can see the e®ect of µ on the growth rate in Figures 1, 2, and 3. In
Figure 1, when LN=LS < ¿3, a decrease in the a±liation costs decreases the
growth rate. In Figures 2 and 3, when LN=LS 2 (¿3; 1=¿), the relationship
between the a±liation costs and the growth rate follows a U-shaped curve.
We explain Proposition 2 intuitively. From Proposition 1, a decrease in the
a±liation costs lowers the share of manufacturing ¯rms in the North. From
(34), the manufactured goods market in the North becomes less competitive,
and its market in the South becomes competitive. The pro¯ts gained in the
North, then, increase, and pro¯ts gained in the South decrease. If an increase
in pro¯ts gained in the North is larger than a decrease in pro¯ts gained in the
South, the pro¯ts of manufacturing ¯rms increase. An increase in the pro¯t
pushes up the value of R&D investment, and the growth rate increases.
When LN is small relative to LS , the South has a large market relative to
the North. The pro¯ts gained in the North are then smaller than pro¯t losses
in the South. Therefore, in this case, an increase in µ depresses the growth rate.
It is noteworthy that the reverse could occur when LN is relatively large. If
the a±liation costs are su±ciently high, the manufactured goods market in the
North is still competitive. Thus, the pro¯ts gained in the North are smaller
than pro¯t losses in the South, which lowers the growth rate again. However, if
the a±liation costs are su±ciently low, the manufactured goods market in the
North is less competitive. In this case, the pro¯ts gained in the North could
dominate pro¯t losses in the South, and, thus, the growth rate could be higher.
3.2 E®ects of trade costs
Next, we study the e®ects of trade costs on growth rates. Before analyzing the
e®ects of trade costs on growth rates, we investigate the relationship between
trade costs and the share of manufacturing ¯rms. From (27), we can rewrite
the equilibrium share of manufacturing ¯rms in the North as follows:
s¤ =
f0(¿)
f0(¿)¡ f1(¿) ; (37)
where
f0(¿) = (1¡ µ¿)LN + (¿ ¡ µ)¿LS ; (38)
and
f1(¿) = ¿(1¡ µ¿)LN + (¿ ¡ µ)LS : (39)
The denominator of (27) or (37) is positive for any interior equilibrium (i.e.,
s¤ 2 (0; 1)) since the numerator of (37), f0(¿), is positive because of µ > µN > ¿ .
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Thus, we know that f1(¿) ¸ 0 is equivalent to s¤ = 1. Substituting ¿ = 0 and
¿ = 1 into (39), we have
f1(0) = ¡µLS < 0;
f1(1) = (1¡ µ)(LN + LS) > 0:
Since f1(¿) is a concave function of ¿ , we obtain the boundary of ¿ , where all
¯rms agglomerate in the North:
Lemma 3 There is a threshold value ¿1 2 (0; 1) of the trade freeness of manu-
factured varieties so that s¤ = 1 if and only if ¿ 2 [¿1; 1).
This lemma suggests that all ¯rms agglomerate in the North if trade costs
are su±ciently small. The reason is as follows. In our model, two primary
e®ects determine ¯rm location, namely, market size and a±liation cost. The
market size e®ect refers to the tendency in which manufacturing ¯rms prefer to
locate in the larger country to save trade costs. Meanwhile, the a±liation cost
e®ect refers to the tendency in which manufacturing ¯rms prefer to locate in
the North to avoid a±liation costs. When trade costs are su±ciently small, the
former e®ect is negligible, since ¯rms can export their products cheaply. Thus,
the a±liation cost e®ect dominates, which suggests that ¯rms agglomerate in
the North, where a±liation costs are not required.
From (27) or (37), we know that f0(¿) > 0 is equivalent to s¤ > 0. If
equation f0(¿) = 0 has two roots, they are denoted as ¿01 and ¿02 (> ¿01).
We then have the following lemma, which gives the conditions for all ¯rms to
agglomerate in the South (see Appendix D for the proof):
Lemma 4 There is a threshold value ¸ 2 (0; µ2) so that s¤ > 0 for any ¿
if LN=LS > ¸; otherwise, s¤ = 0 (resp. s¤ > 0) for ¿ 2 [¿01; ¿02] (resp.
¿ =2 [¿01; ¿02]), where 0 < ¿01 < ¿02 < ¿1.
This lemma suggests that all ¯rms agglomerate in the South if the North
is su±ciently small and trade costs are intermediate. The reason is as follows.
From Lemma 3, we know that all ¯rms agglomerate in the North if trade costs
are su±ciently small. On the other hand, if trade costs are su±ciently large,
¯rms are necessarily dispersed, since it is very costly for ¯rms to export. In
the case of intermediate trade costs, ¯rm distribution depends on the balance of
the market size e®ect and the a±liation cost e®ect. If the North is su±ciently
small, the market size e®ect dominates the a±liation cost e®ect, which results
in attracting all ¯rms to the large country, the South.
For any interior equilibrium, Appendix E gives another expression of the
growth rate:7
g =
¹µ(LN + LS)
´¾(µs+ 1¡ s) ¡ ½: (40)
7Substituting the equilibrium value of s (27) into (33) and (40), we know that the two
expressions of g are equivalent.
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Thus, we know that
@g
@s
> 0 and
@g
@µ
> 0, (41)
which suggests that the growth rate increases if the ¯rm share in the North
increases (and a±liation costs are ¯xed) or if a±liation costs decrease. The
reason is as follows. First, if ¯rms locate in the South, they have to produce
more than ¯rms in the North, since they must pay a±liation costs. Since the
world output of manufactured goods is constant due to (E.1) in Appendix E,
this suggests that both the output and the pro¯t of a ¯rm in the North decrease.
Thus, if s increases or µ increases, the reverse occurs, i.e., the pro¯t in the North
becomes higher. From (32), a higher pro¯t in the North implies a higher growth
rate.
From (27), we obtain
@s
@¿
=
(LN + LS)h(¿)
(1¡ ¿)2(1 + µLS ¡ (µLN + LS)¿)2 ;
where
h(¿) ´ (µ2LN ¡ LS)¿2 ¡ 2(LN ¡ LS)¿ + (LN ¡ µ2LS): (42)
Thus, from (40) and (41), we have
sgn
µ
@g
@¿
¶
= sgn
µ
@s
@¿
¶
= sgn [h(¿)] ; (43)
If equation h(¿) = 0 has two roots in (0; 1), the smaller root is denoted as ¿2.
The next proposition is then derived (see Appendix E for the proof):
Proposition 5 (E®ects of trade costs on growth rates).
i) When LN=LS > µ2, it holds that @g=@¿ > 0 for ¿ 2 (0; ¿1).
ii) When LN=LS 2 (¸; µ2), it holds that @g=@¿ < 0 for ¿ 2 (0; ¿2) and @g=@¿ > 0
for ¿ 2 (¿2; ¿1).
iii) When LN=LS < ¸, it holds that @g=@¿ < 0 for ¿ 2 (0; ¿01) and @g=@¿ > 0
for ¿ 2 (¿02; ¿1).
Figures 4, 5, and 6 correspond to the case of i), ii), and iii) in Proposition
5, respectively. This proposition suggests that the growth rate monotonously
increases in ¿ if the North is large relative to the South; otherwise, the growth
rate evolves in a U-shaped pattern when trade costs decline. From (43), we
know that the growth rate and the ¯rm share of the North co-evolve in the
same direction. From Lemmas 3 and 4, if the North is su±ciently smaller than
the South, ¯rms ¯rst disperse and then agglomerate in the South and, ¯nally, in
the North when trade costs decline. This suggests that the growth rate follows
a U-shaped curve. On the other hand, if the North is relatively large, the net
e®ect of the two primary factors, the market size e®ect and the a±liation cost
e®ect, accelerates agglomeration in the North when trade costs decline. Thus,
the growth rate monotonously increases in ¿ .
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4 Welfare analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare level in both countries. From r = ½
and wit = 1, we can rewrite the intertemporal budget constraint as follows:Z 1
0
e¡½tEitdt = ai0 +
Z 1
0
e¡½tdt; (44)
where ai0 is the present value of assets owned by a worker in country i. Be-
cause the expenditure levels in both countries are constant in equilibrium, the
expenditure level in each country is given by
Eit = 1 + ½ai0: (45)
The total value of assets at the initial time is [nNVN0 + nS(VS0 + VL0)]. We
assume that the ratio of assets held in the North at the initial time is ³ and the
ratio of assets held in the South at the initial time is 1¡ ³. The assets held in
both countries are represented by
aN0 =
³
LN
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] ; (46)
aS0 =
1¡ ³
LS
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] : (47)
Therefore, the expenditure levels in both countries are given by
ENt = 1 + ½
³
LN
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] ; (48)
ESt = 1 + ½
1¡ ³
LS
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] : (49)
Then, substituting (4), (5), (6), (48), and (49) into (1), we obtain the welfare
levels in both countries as follows:
UN =
Z 1
0
e¡½tf1 + ½³
LN
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] + ¹(log¹¡ 1)
+
¹
¾ ¡ 1 log[(
¾ ¡ 1
¾
)1¡¾(nN + ¿nS)]gdt; (50)
US =
Z 1
0
e¡½tf1 + ½(1¡ ³)
LS
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] + ¹(log¹¡ 1)
+
¹
¾ ¡ 1 log[(
¾ ¡ 1
¾
)1¡¾(nN¿ + nS)]gdt: (51)
Then, from nt = n0egt, the welfare levels in both countries are given by
½UN = 1 +
½³
LN
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] + ¹(log¹¡ 1) + ¹
¾ ¡ 1 log n0
¡ ¹ log(¾ ¡ 1
¾
) +
¹
¾ ¡ 1 log[(1¡ ¿)s+ ¿ ] +
g
½
; (52)
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½US = 1 +
½(1¡ ³)
LS
[´ + (1¡ s)Â] + ¹(log¹¡ 1) + ¹
¾ ¡ 1 log n0
¡ ¹ log(¾ ¡ 1
¾
) +
¹
¾ ¡ 1 log[1¡ (1¡ ¿)s] +
g
½
: (53)
Then, di®erentiating UN and US with respect to µ, we obtain the following
equations:
½
@UN
@µ
= ¡½³Â
LN
@s
@µ
+
¹
¾ ¡ 1
·
1¡ ¿
(1¡ ¿)s+ ¿
@s
@µ
+
1
½
@g
@µ
¸
: (54)
½
@US
@µ
= ¡½(1¡ ³)Â
LS
@s
@µ
+
¹
¾ ¡ 1
·
¡ 1¡ ¿
1¡ (1¡ ¿)s
@s
@µ
+
1
½
@g
@µ
¸
: (55)
We explain the relationship between µ and the welfare level in the North. The
sign of the ¯rst term is positive. The sign of the ¯rst term in the square bracket
is negative, and the sign of the second term in the square bracket is ambiguous.
The ¯rst term is a positive e®ect in which a decrease in the a±liation costs
increases the total value of the assets and increases the expenditure level. This
e®ect then increases the welfare level in the North. The ¯rst term in the square
bracket is a negative e®ect: when there is an increase in µ, the number of ¯rms
producing in the South increases, and the price level in the North increases.
The welfare level in the North then decreases. At last, the second term in the
square bracket is an ambiguous e®ect because the relationship between µ and
the growth rates is ambiguous. In the same way, we explain the relationship
between µ and the welfare level in the South.
In order to get some clear results, we present numerical examples. In this
example, the number of population in both countries are LN = 0:3 and LS = 1
respectively. The subjective discount rate is ½ = 0:05 and the elasticity of
substitution is ¾ = 1:5. The e±ciency of R&D investment is ´ = 1:3. The
initial number of the manufactured goods is n0 = 1. The ratio of asset holding
in the North at initial time is ³ = 1. Figures 7, 8 and 9 represent the e®ect of
µ on the welfare of the North and the welfare of the South. Figure 7 depicts
the case that LN=LS < ¿3, Figure 8 depicts the case that ¿3 < LN=LS < ¿ ,
and Figure 9 depicts the case that LN=LS > ¿ . In Figure 7, from Proposition
2, a decline in a±liation costs lowers the growth rates monotonously and the
welfare level in both countries are also lowered by a decline in a±liation costs.
In Figures 8 and 9, from Proposition 2, the relationship between growth rates
and the a±liation costs follows the U-shaped curve. Therefore, the welfare level
of the South follows the U-shaped curve.
We study the e®ect of trade costs on welfare. Di®erentiating UN and US
with respect to ¿ , we can obtain the following equation:
½
@UN
@¿
= ¡½³Â
LN
@s
@¿
+
¹
¾ ¡ 1
·
1¡ ¿
(1¡ ¿)s+ ¿
@s
@¿
+
1
½
@g
@¿
+
1¡ s
1¡ (1¡ ¿)s
¸
: (56)
½
@US
@¿
= ¡½(1¡ ³)Â
LS
@s
@¿
+
¹
¾ ¡ 1
·
¿ ¡ 1
1¡ (1¡ ¿)s
@s
@¿
+
1
½
@g
@¿
+
s
1¡ (1¡ ¿)s
¸
:
(57)
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The ¯rst three terms in RHS of (56) and (57) are the same with respect to
the e®ect of µ on UN and US , which are expressed in (54) and (55). The last
terms in RHS in both equations are positive, which represents the direct e®ect
of decline in trade costs. Figures 10 , 11 and 12 depict the e®ect of trade costs on
the welfare of the North and the welfare of the South. Figure 10 depicts the case
that LN=LS > µ2. From Proposition 3, trade liberalization raises the growth
rates monotonously. Then, trade liberalization raises the welfare level in both
countries for ¿ < 0:4 in Figure 10. On the other hand, when ¿ > 0:4, all of ¯rms
locate in the North. Therefore, trade liberalization does not a®ect the welfare of
the North and raises the welfare of the South monotonously. Figure 11 depicts
the case that ¹¸ < LN=LS < µ2. From Proposition 3, the relationship between
trade liberalization and the growth rate follows the U-shaped curve. However,
when trade costs are su±ciently high, the direct e®ect is larger than the indirect
e®ect and trade liberalization raises welfare level of both countries. Figure 12
depicts the case that LN=LS < ¹¸. From Proposition 3, when ¿01 < ¿ < ¿02, the
number of ¯rms locating in the North is zero. Then, trade liberalization does
not a®ect the welfare of the South and raises the welfare of North monotonously.
5 Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we constructed a model introducing a±liation costs
of ¯rms into the Grossman-Helpman-Romer-type growth theory with a New
Economic Geography model. This paper focuses on two distinct faces of global-
ization: the decline of a±liation costs and the decrease in trade costs of goods.
We investigated the e®ects of a¯lliation costs on growth rates. When the market
size of the North is relatively small, a decline in a±liation costs reduces growth
rates of the economy. On the other hand, when the market size of the North
is relatively large, the growth rate follows a U-shaped curve as a±liation costs
decrease.
We also studied the e®ects of trade costs on growth rates. If the population
of the North is small enough relative to that of the South, the number of ¯rms
in the North ¯rst decreases and then increases after a decline in trade costs. On
the other hand, if the population in the North is relatively large, the number of
¯rms in the North monotonously increases with a decline in trade costs. In the
former case, the growth rate follows a U-shaped curve, while, in the latter case,
the growth rate monotonously increases with a decline in trade costs.
In this paper, we assume that equilibrium wages in two countries are constant
and the same. We can construct a model in which wages are endogenously
determined. We assume that innovation activities can be done in one country.
We can extend the model to one in which innovation activities can be operated
in both countries. These are problems for additional research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating (16) with respect to θ, we can obtain the following equation:
∂s∗
∂θ
=
−τ(LN + LS)[(1− θτ)LN − (τ − θ)LS ]− (−τLN + LS)[(1− θτ)LN + (τ − θ)τLS ]
(1− τ)[(1− θτ)LN − (τ − θ)LS ]2
=
(τLN − LS − τLN − τLS)(1− θτ)LN + [τ(τLN − LS) + τ(LN + LS)](τ − θ)LS
(1− τ)[(1− θτ)LN − (τ − θ)LS ]2
= − (1 + τ) [(1− θτ) + (θ − τ)]LNLS
(1− τ)[(1− θτ)LN − (τ − θ)LS ]2 < 0, (A.1)
because θ > τ .
B Deviation of θN < θS
Subtracting θN from θS , we can obtain the following equation:
LN + τ2LS
τ(LN + LS)
− τ(LN + LS)
τ2LN + LS
=
(LN + τ2LS)(τ2LN + LS)− τ2(LN + LS)2
τ(LN + LS)(τ2LN + LS)
=
(τ2 − 1)2LNLS
τ(LN + LS)(τ2LN + LS)
> 0. (B.1)
Then, θS is larger than θN .
C Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1 and (35), we know that the sign of ∂g/∂θ is equivalent to
the sign of F (θ). Then, we investigate the sign of F (θ). F ′(θ) and F ′′(θ) are
given by
F ′(θ) = −2(τ − θ)LS + 2τ2(1− θτ)LN , (C.1)
F ′′(θ) = 2(LS − τ3LN ) > 0, (C.2)
where the last inequality is from Assumption 1. From θ > τ and F
′′
(θ) > 0,
the sign of F
′
(θ) is given by
F ′(θ) > F ′(τ) = 2τ2(1− τ2)LN > 0 (C.3)
Therefore, F ′(θ) > 0 for θ ≥ τ . Then, the value of F (1), F (θN ), and F (θS) can
be obtained as follows:
F (1) = (1− τ)2(LS − τLN ), (C.4)
F (θN ) =
(1− τ2)2τLNLS
(τ2LN + LS)2
(τLN − LS), (C.5)
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Figure C.3: τLS < LN <
LS/τ
F (θS) =
(1− τ2)2LNLS
τ2(LN + LS)2
(LN − τ3LS). (C.6)
Then, we have F (θN ) < 0 from Assumption 1, while F (θS) R 0 holds when
LN R τ3LS .
When LN < τ3LS , we have 0 < θS < 1, F (θN ) < 0, and F (θS) < 0. Then,
we can depict F (θ) in Figure C.1. Because F ′(θ) > 0 for θ > τ , F (θN ) < 0,
and F (θS) < 0, we know that F (θ) is negative for θN < θ < θS . Therefore,
∂g/∂θ < 0 holds.
When τ3LS < LN < τLS , we have 0 < θS < 1, F (θN ) < 0, and F (θS) > 0.
Then, we can depict F (θ) in Figure C.2. Because F (θN ) < 0 and F (θS) > 0,
there exists the unique solution of F (θˆ) = 0. Then, F (θ) is negative for θN <
θ < θˆ and F (θ) is positive for θˆ < θ < θS . Therefore, ∂g/∂θ < 0 holds for
θN < θ < θˆ and ∂g/∂θ > 0 holds for θˆ < θ < θS .
When τLS < LN < LS/τ , we have θS > 1, F (θN ) < 0, and F (1) > 0. Then,
we can depict F (θ) in Figure C.3. Because F (θN ) < 0 and F (1) > 0, there
exists the unique solution of F (θˆ) = 0. Then, F (θ) is negative for θN < θ < θˆ
and F (θ) is positive for θˆ < θ < 1. Therefore, ∂g/∂θ < 0 holds for θN < θ < θˆ
and ∂g/∂θ > 0 holds for θˆ < θ < 1.
D Proof of Lemma 2
We investigate the value of f0(τ). We have s∗ > 0 if f0(τ) > 0; other-
wise s∗ = 0. From (38), we know that if LN > [τ(θ − τ)/ (1− θτ)]LS , then
f0(τ) > 0. In the following, we investigate the condition which holds LN >
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[τ(θ − τ)/ (1− θτ)]LS . Since
∂
∂τ
[
τ(θ − τ)
1− θτ
]
=
θτ2 − 2τ + θ
(1− θτ)2 ,
θτ2 − 2τ + θ|τ=0 = θ > 0,
θτ2 − 2τ + θ|τ=θ = θ3 − θ < 0,
θτ2 − 2τ + θ|τ=1 = 2(θ − 1) < 0,
we know that [τ(θ − τ)/ (1− θτ)]LS is maximized (and positive) at τ ∈ (0, θ),
which is the smaller root of θτ2 − 2τ + θ = 0. Let λ ≡ [τ(θ − τ)/ (1− θτ)].
Thus, if LN > λLS , then f0(τ) > 0, which is equivalent to s∗ > 0 for any τ
because of (37). Furthermore, since
f0(0) = LN > 0,
f0(1) = (1− θ)(LN + LS) > 0,
the equation f0(τ) = 0 has two roots, τ01, τ02, in (0, 1) if LN < λLS . Thus, if
LN < λLS , it holds that s∗ = 0 for τ ∈ [τ01, τ02] because of (37).
The difference of θ2 and λ is
θ2 − τ(θ − τ)
1− θτ
=
τ2 − θ(1 + θ2)τ + θ2
1− θτ . (D.1)
We know that the numerator of (D.1) is positive since the discriminant is[
θ(1 + θ2)
]2 − 4θ2 = θ2 [(1 + θ2)2 − 4] < 0.
This implies that λ < θ2. Finally, if τ02 ≥ τ1, it holds that s∗ = 1 in [τ1, τ02]
from Lemma 1, which contradicts the last result. Thus, τ02 < τ1.
E Proof of Proposition 3
For the interior equilibrium (i.e., s∗ ∈ (0, 1)), from the market clearing condition
of manufacutured goods, we have
µ(LN + LS) =
σ
σ − 1 (nNtqNt + nStqSt) = σ
(
nNt +
nSt
θ
)
piNt, (E.1)
where the second equality is from (12) and (26). Thus, we have
piNt =
µθ(LN + LS)
σ(θnNt + nSt)
.
From this equation and (32), we have another expression of the growth rate:
g =
µθ(LN + LS)
ησ(θs+ 1− s) − ρ.
In addition, the next lemma holds concerning the function h(τ) defined by (42):
22
Lemma E.1 It holds that h(τ1) ≥ 0. Furthermore, if LN < LN , it holds that
h(τ01) ≤ 0 and h(τ02) ≥ 0.
Proof. If h(τ1) < 0, we have ∂s/∂τ < 0 at τ = τ1 from (43). It evidently
contradicts Lemma 1. If h(τ01) > 0, we have ∂s/∂τ > 0 at τ = τ01 from (43).
It evidently contradicts Lemma 2. Finally, we can show that h(τ02) ≥ 0 in a
similar way.
From (42), we know that
h(0) = LN − θ2LS ,
h(1) = (LN − LS)(1− θ)2,
and the vertex of h(τ) is
τ∗ ≡ LN − LS
θ2LN − LS .
We consider the following four cases separately: (a) θ2LS < LS < θ2LN < LN ,
(b) θ2LS < θ2LN < LS < LN , (c) θ2LN < θ2LS < LN < LS , and (d)
θ2LN < LN < θ
2LS < LS . We know that τ∗ > 1, h(0) > 0, h(1) > 0, and h(τ)
is convex in case (a), while τ∗ < 0, h(0) > 0, h(1) > 0, and h(τ) is concave
in case (b). Thus, we conclude that h(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, 1) in these two cases.
In case (c), we know that τ∗ ∈ (0, 1), h(0) > 0, h(1) < 0, and h(τ) is concave.
From Lemma E.1, we conclude that h(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, τ1). Summarizing the
results of (a)-(c), we have i) in Proposition 3 by (43).
In case (d), we know that τ∗ ∈ (0, 1), h(0) < 0, h(1) < 0, and h(τ) is
concave. From Lemma E.1 and the definition of τ2 (i.e., the smaller root of
h(τ) = 0), we conclude that τ2 < τ1, h(τ) < 0 for τ ∈ (0, τ2) and h(τ) > 0 for
τ ∈ (τ2, τ1). Therefore, from Lemmas 2, E.1, and Equation (43), we obtain ii)
and iii) in Proposition 3.
23
g θN θS
θ

Figure 1: The relationship between transaction costs and growth rate when
LN/LS < τ
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Figure 2: The relationship between transaction costs and growth rate when
LN/LS ∈ (τ3, τ)
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Figure 3: The relationship between transaction costs and growth rate when
LN/LS ∈ (τ, 1/τ)
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Figure 4: The relationship between trade costs and growth rate when LN/LS >
θ2
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Figure 5: The relationship between trade costs and growth rate when LN/LS ∈
(λ¯, θ2)
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Figure 6: The relationship between trade costs and growth rate when LN/LS <
λ¯
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Figure 7: τ = 0.8
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Figure 8: when τ = 0.6
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Figure 9: when τ = 0.4
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Figure 10: when θ = 0.5
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Figure 11: when θ = 0.7
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Figure 12: when θ = 0.9
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